The debate over the nature of egalitarianism has come to dominate political philosophy. As ever more sophisticated attempts are made to describe the principles of an egalitarian distribution or to specify the good or goods that should be distributed equally, little is said about the fundamental basis of equality. In virtue of what should people be regarded as equal? Egalitarians have tended to dismiss this question of fundamental equality. In the first part of the paper I will examine some of these strategies of marginalisation and assess whether the issue of fundamental equality matters. Jeremy Waldron has criticised this strategy of avoidance in his recent book God, Locke and Equality. He argues that Locke's turn to a theistic grounding for fundamental equality provides a better approach to the problem than the approach taken by contemporary liberals such as John Rawls. I will examine Waldron's critique of Rawls and show that it is wanting. I will conclude by suggesting that Rawls' approach to the issue has a bearing on the way in which equality should be understood as a political value. This argument for the primacy of a political conception of egalitarianism has a bearing on the interconnection between core liberal values and the idea of the state that has been emphasised by Rawls, Dworkin and Nagel.
Defending egalitarianism
It is customary to credit Rawls with resurrecting normative political theory ', Ethics, vol. 99, (1989) pp. 906-44. important questions, but in some sense these are the fundamental questions for egalitarians. The reason for this is that a more fundamental sense of equality is assumed by all the rival candidate theories that one finds in modern politics. The differences between such theories are not differences between those who regard mankind as equals and those who believe in racial or hierarchical political theories, rather they are differences over how equality of the relevant kind may be achieved. In this general sense every serious candidate theory is concerned with equality, the interesting differences between theories concern answers to questions such as 'Equality of What?' or 'The Currency of Egalitarian Justice'. 3 Some will argue that the only goods to be distributed equally are basic rights to life, liberty and property, others will focus on social primary goods without which no decent life is possible, others still will try and cash-out the conditions of a valuable life in terms of a bundle of resources which individuals can use differently in pursuing their preferred conceptions of the good life. On this Dworkinian view the broad commitment to equality of concern and respect is the only game in town, what matters for politics and for political theorists is which candidate theory of egalitarianism can see off its opponents. This insight 3 The exploration of this Dworkinian idea forms the principle narrative of W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 2 nd edn., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 2-5. seems to capture an important aspect of the practice of political philosophy where theory construction and criticism is what political theorists do. 4 But more importantly Dworkin's argument shifts the meaning of egalitarian from those who believe in basic equality (as he claims that pretty much everyone believes in equality now) to a more specific answer to the 'currency' and 1983, pp. 187-8. reason for this is that showing that a particular perspective can withstand a critical engagement with other theories cannot show its uniqueness as the right basis for social cooperation and political coercion. This is because a theory's unique ability to withstand critical challenge depends upon being able to set limits to the range of possible rival candidate theories. In the case of arguments for egalitarianism these rival theories will not only be alternative egalitarian theories up to and including utilitarianism but also the whole range of non-egalitarian arguments and theories. Just as the strategy of internal analysis and criticism will not single out the uniqueness of egalitarianism amongst its rivals so similarly it will not provide support to the idea of fundamental equality, as there is no non-question begging sense in which egalitarianism must win out over non-egalitarian theories.
Do we need an account of Basic Equality?
A question we might ask ourselves at this point is whether it really matters that we do not provide a justification or defence of fundamental equality? I There are three main reasons why the question of basic equality might well matter and therefore why it should merit some equal attention amongst those political philosophers who regard themselves as egalitarian.
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The first reason is the most obvious and concerns the ability of egalitarians to say something to anti-egalitarians, Nietzscheans and the defenders of natural aristocracy. Although most contemporary political philosophy is conducted against the background of a weak commitment to equality of 9 I am not suggesting that there should be a complete redirection of attention from questions about the currency of egalitarian justice or the nature of what should be distributed. All I am suggesting is that some attention should be given to this fundamental question as well, and that certainly seems to be lacking in the contemporary literature.
concern and respect it is certainly not the case that everyone accepts this premise. It is certainly not the case that in the wider world egalitarianism is the norm, whatever Dworkin might claim. As well as the unattractive claims of racists, misogynists and homophobes, many people do think that there are ethically relevant differences between people that undermine the idea of basic equality. These anti-egalitarian claims can be based on prejudice but it is not a sign of prejudice as such that one rejects basic equality, as many egalitarians deny that all departures from equality are morally significant.
Some inequalities can be egalitarian.
The rejection of egalitarianism can take many forms. Some might argue that there are no grounds for attributing equal worth to persons in any respect, because there are no grounds for attributing moral worth to persons as such.
Followers of Nietzsche fall into this group. They see the claims of equality as part of the 'slave morality' legacy of Christianity, which in its attempt to overcome natural hierarchy undermines the status of any ethical values and leaves us with nihilism. 10 For the nihilist anything goes because every claim to value is the assertion of the will to power. The Nietzschean challenge is similar to the challenge of the amoralist, to whom perhaps no general answer to the question why be moral can be given. But the challenge for the egalitarian is also different, because even if we can give some kind of ethical response to the Nietzschean, of the sort that he too is involved in a kind of ethical practice, it does not follow that this response will result in equal concern and respect.
Not all anti-egalitarians are nihilists or Nietzsche inspired relativists. Some philosophers take a realist but anti-egalitarian view, a good example is John
Kekes. Kekes rubbishes basic equality on its own grounds by claiming that because egalitarians do not take seriously the issue of evil they are unable to see why some people are less worthy of moral consideration than others and hence are not in the relevant sense equals. He gives the examples of torturers, murderers and concentration camp guards as the sort of people who show through their actions that they are less worthy of consideration than others. 11 Kekes's argument is important, in at least this respect, in that he argues against prescriptive or moral equality, whilst potentially conceding the case in favour of descriptive equality. Thus all people may satisfy some natural criterion of equality as human beings (all having interests) yet fail to satisfy the relevant criteria of moral equality because of the repugnance of their acts and motives. It is at least arguable that certain kinds of person are not worthy of equal consideration even if we decline to deny them any protection of the law. We might for example find some people so repugnant in their acts, (torturers are a good example) that we deny them equal concern and respect in any meaningful sense, and the only reason we do not allow them to become total moral outlaws is the concern not to demean ourselves rather than any concern for their status.
Without some criterion of basic equality we have no way of responding to the challenge of anti-egalitarians and this fact is perhaps more pressing today than for many years because of the unfortunate consequences of the so- Kekes who wants to reject substantive egalitarianism as well, but it is one that could be based on his anti-egalitarian argument from evil. There is no good reason for the anti-egalitarian to reject the idea that once one has weeded out all the torturers and other evildoers, amongst the remainder equality might be the appropriate grounds of moral and political recognition. This is not unlike the idea of equality between equals that we find in Basic equality is so fundamental to innumerable aspects of our ethical outlook that it requires a special sort of defense -at once transcendent and powerful -so that it can both underpin what are usually taken to be the starting points of public justification and also 15 I am aware that most cosmopolitans will answer that they do have a conception of basic equality which gives priority to humanity over other forms of ethical relationship, on the grounds that they are concerned with humanities equal status as the bearer of interests. This is however too quick as the idea of human interests is still controversial, indeed it is partly what theories of egalitarian justice try to explain. Some accounts of basic interests might actually presuppose membership of certain kinds of communities, such as juridical states, in order for people to enjoy freedom.
prevail in the face of the various temptations that invite us to start drawing distinctions between types and grades of human being.
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In the next section of the paper I propose to examine Waldron's argument based on his reading of Locke and his use of this to mount a critique of the treatment of basic equality in contemporary liberalism such as that of John Rawls. Before turning to Waldron's argument it is worthwhile just reminding our selves of the point of turning to basic or fundamental equality.
The issue is in virtue of what are human beings deserving of equal consideration and respect? My point will not be to provide an unchallengeable defence of equality, rather the point will be to identify the nature of the claim to basic equality as only then will we be in a position to determine the requirements of any defence or justification of that claim.
Basic Equality -Christian or Liberal?
Waldron's discussion of basic equality is developed in the context of his reinterpretation of Locke's moral and political philosophy. One of the distinctive features of his argument is that Locke should be read as a philosopher who has potentially interesting things to say about fundamental philosophical problems and not merely as an historical curiosity. concedes is a natural capacity, or how we move from descriptive to prescriptive equality? It is here that Locke's argument takes a theological turn and it is at this point that Waldron also argues that the significance of the appeal to God becomes important for making sense of equal status and value.
The argument works in the following way, the capacity of abstract reasoning is identified as significant, not simply because it is widely universally shared (though to differing degrees) by all human beings. Instead the significance of abstract reasoning is that it enables each person to understand themselves as a part of the created order and from this they can reason to their obligation to preserve that order including other moral equals as part of the basic moral obligation we have to God. The idea seems to be as there is something rather than nothing there must have been a creator and therefore, a purpose to that creation of which human agents are a part. As soon as they ask themselves why have they been endowed uniquely with this capacity for abstract thought they will begin on an easy process of reasoning to the idea of a created order that gives a purpose and therefore a meaning to the possession and exercise of these capacities.
There are a number of important points to note from Waldron's account of Locke's theory. Firstly, a straightforward appeal to a natural property will not be sufficient to ground basic equality. Secondly, that natural capacity is a range property that admits of significant differences in degree. Thirdly, the appeal to God provides the important account of the significance of this capacity -what Waldron calls the 'shape' of basic equality. It is important, according to Waldron that Locke's appeal to God is not for the traditional natural law idea of an authoritative sanction of our basic moral obligation.
Clearly, for Locke, God does sanction the basic moral law of equal respect, but that is not the key point. The appeal to God and therefore a transcendent authority, provides the meaning and significance of the real resemblances (corporeality and capacity for rationality) on which moral equality is based.
Thus the appeal to God in the defence of basic equality is not merely a contingent fact of Locke's historical circumstances that can be bracketed off from his 'proper' philosophical doctrines, it is central to his defence of equality. Yet Waldron also rejects the obvious contemporary response, which is that, if the defence of equality depends upon an appeal to God so much the worse for equality. It is hard enough trying to defend egalitarianism without having to defend the existence of God as Locke conceives him. It is precisely this source of transcendence that is significantly missing, according to Waldron in contemporary liberal theories of basic equality, and it is perhaps the embarrassment at having no such transcendent significance that causes liberals to fall back on either silence or a muted appeal to individuals as bearers of interests.
Precisely what we are supposed to make of Waldron's argument is carefully ambiguous. One could take the view that he is merely repeating the standard criticism of liberal theories to the effect that the bracketing strategy and the avoidance of substantive philosophical or metaphysical commitments is Waldron's demand cannot be that Rawls sees off all challengers to his account of basic equality, as Waldron's own Lockean theory is hardly likely to fair even as well as Rawls's. For if Waldron argument is not merely for the development of a philosophical anthropology before we can do political theory, but the more demanding claim that we need to take theology seriously, then his position would seem far more precarious than Rawls's.
His argument does seem to play into the hands of the Nietzscheans by saying that equality depends upon a conception of God, but as we have no good arguments for belief in God we cannot sustain a conception of equality.
Locke may well be providing us with an argument for basic equality but it is hardly one we should take very seriously. Rawls does not set the barrier of justification quite so high, so the idea of self-sufficiency in his account of basic equality must count as an advantage over Waldron and Locke. If the question is the role and purpose of basic equality it is not obvious that Waldron's turn to the transcendent is necessary, although clearly some argument beyond the identification of a natural property is important. Where
Waldron's argument ultimately differs is on the issue of the sanction of basic equality, or why we should respect it. But this is a different question to how we identify the meaning and significance of basic equality, and it is one that depends on the existence of God for its answer. And this is something that Waldron does not prove. What can we conclude from the above? Rawls does not provide the only possible route to the justification of a liberal egalitarian perspective, but his approach to the issue of basic equality is insightful because it does not wholly marginalize the issue in the way that Dworkin's rival theory of liberal egalitarianism appears to. Furthermore, Rawls' theory connects the specification of basic equality to the context of a special form of political association but does not wholly subordinate equality to the issue of the internal structure of a just state. In more general terms we can also see that whilst the defence of basic equality forms an important part of the defence of substantive egalitarian theories of distributive justice, one can overstate the importance of defending basic equality along the lines suggested by Waldron. Where this leaves us, is with a defence of the status quo in terms of how political philosophers should proceed. The analysis and critique of rival theories of egalitarianism has an important role in the wider defence of basic equality. What we should not expect is some theory independent account of a basic natural property in virtue of which people become moral equals, but neither should we lament the fact of the absence of such a property. The appeal to basic equality is important in making sense of the egalitarian project but the account of basic equality is not a straightforward first premise from which all else must be derived. It is a central part of the process of egalitarian argument in so far as it forces us to concentrate on the issue of the scope of our principles, and this is something that can be lost in 34 a preoccupation with issues such as the currency of egalitarian justice. But in making the defence of basic equality depend on the articulation of an egalitarian theory of the just political community we open up scope not only for philosophical arguments but also establish opportunities for other forms of political theorising to assist in providing representations of the core idea of basic equality and the forms of social relationships on which it depends.
Although Waldron's account of Locke proved to be unhelpful in providing the foundation of basic equality, perhaps there is scope for marshalling past historical thinkers and modes of thought in defending basic equality. Perhaps I could suggest Tom Paine.
